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Two facts of corporate life are that 
• the public lacks confidence in much of the 
reported financial information, and 
• corporate directors bear responsibility for, 
and may incur liability as a result of, mis-
leading financial information. 
To solve these very real problems, several pro-
fessional and regulatory groups have proposed 
that public corporations use audit committees 
made up of members of their boards of 
directors.(1) 
We at Touche Ross have actively supported the 
position taken by these groups—that corporate 
audit committees can greatly promote the 
public and corporate good. Further, we have 
sponsored extensive research in this field by 
Professors R. K. Mautz and F. L . Neumann, 
both of the University of Illinois. Results of 
their research are now being published. ( 2 , 3 ) 
We recommend that publicly-owned companies 
have audit committees and that they consist 
largely of outside directors. We recommend 
that each committee be organized in a manner 
carefully calculated to make it effective in ad-
vancing corporate responsibility. Privately-
owned companies that issue financial statements 
to outsiders (e.g. for credit purposes) should 
also follow this recommendation. 
(1) The Executive Committee of the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants issued in July, 
1967, a recommendation that audit committees be 
formed. In November, 1968, a committee of the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants made 
recommendations for legislation that would make 
such committees mandatory for publicly-owned com-
panies. The New York Stock Exchange, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, and other regulatory 
bodies have given attention to the need for audit 
committees. 
(2) Corporate Audit Committees: A Research Re-
port by R. K. Mautz and F. L. Neumann (to be pub-
lished; Bureau of Economic and Business Research, 
University of Illinois). 
(3) The effective corporate audit committee, by R. 
K. Mautz and F. L. Neumann (Harvard Business 
Review, November-December, 1970). 
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Issues concerning the composition and the ob-
jectives of corporate audit committees, and 
questions concerning the scope and manner of 
their operation are discussed herein. Part of 
the material presented here, together with the 
supporting data, will appear in the report on 
the Mautz-Neumann research study. However, 
in certain respects, the emphasis in this mono-
graph differs from that of the research study. 
Why Have an Audit Committee? 
The recently issued court opinion in the Bar-
Chris case(4) has focused attention on the very 
real responsibility of directors for public re-
porting of financial information; from this re-
sponsibility, extensive legal liability may be 
incurred. Outside directors ordinarily are in 
a relatively poor position to be able to assume 
this responsibility. Their contact with financial 
information at full board meetings is ordinarily 
superficial. Little time is available — on the 
agenda of a busy board—for a careful review of 
accounting and financial controls. 
If an outside director is to intelligently under-
take financial responsibilities, he must have 
background on the structure and nature of fi-
nancial controls applied within the company. 
He must also have knowledge of the alternative 
generally accepted accounting principles that 
may be appropriate within the industry. 
And his knowledge of accounting principles 
must be up to date—he must be aware of the 
rapidly changing environment being brought 
about by new pronouncements of the Account-
ing Principles Board of the AICPA. 
Many outside directors have expressed the need 
for personal contact with the independent CPAs 
of their company. Further, many would extend 
this personal contact to officers and employees 
(4) See Federal Securities Law Reporter, Commerce 
Clearing House, '67-'69 Decisions, Transfer Binder 
Supp., ¶92,179. 
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responsible for financial functions at the cor-
porate and divisional levels as well as to those 
engaged in the internal audit function. 
In recent years, discovery of misleading or er-
roneous published financial information has 
made newspaper headlines and has been the 
subject of articles in magazines widely read in 
the financial community. In years gone by, 
probably only the McKesson and Robbins case 
attracted as much attention as have some re-
cently publicized cases. Between the time of 
the McKesson case and the next one to reach 
wide public attention there was a long interval. 
Now, the financial community is seeing an 
accelerating number of financial reporting 
problems, a fact which necessarily affects the 
credibility of all published financial information. 
At annual stockholders' meetings, questions are 
often directed to the officers of the company, 
and to its CPAs, indicating the concern of stock-
holders about the company's financial controls 
and about the nature of the audit performed by 
the CPAs. Many stockholders believe that the 
necessarily extensive relations between the of-
ficers of a corporation and the partners of its 
accounting firm are too close. They then raise 
questions of independence, and of domination 
over financial reporting by management. 
The question of independence is also affected 
by the situations where there have been sudden 
replacements of one auditing firm by another. 
There is concern whether the independent cer-
tified public accountant has an adequate chan-
nel within the company to convey his thoughts 
to non-management directors about important 
issues. 
Stockholders want assurance that the function 
of financial control over assets is under the 
surveillance of members of the board. Even 
though in specific instances there are no facts 
to support the doubts expressed, the credibility 
problem does exist—and credibility does in-
fluence stockholders, as it should. 
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The problems of improved reporting and of 
adequate controls are not shadows in the public 
mind. Directors have responsibility for these 
problems, and their potential legal liabilities 
can not and should not be discounted. 
Appropriate attention at the policy level is 
needed to bring about substantive improve-
ments in both reporting and control. Corporate 
policies concerning accounting and control are 
the base upon which rests the quality of these 
functions. Financial officers often become more 
effective when members of the board are deeply 
interested in financial reporting and controls. 
Who should generate the impetus to better fi-
nancial reporting and control? While the pro-
fession should be continuously responsive to 
the needs of the financial community, there are 
areas of improvement that must come from the 
companies themselves. 
If a board is to support accounting and control 
policies relating to complex matters, the board 
must first understand the issues involved. For 
many directors, even a comprehension of the 
responsibilities CPAs express in their opinions 
on financial statements can only come from 
personal exposure. Such matters as the bases 
used for valuing assets, setting up reserves, 
providing for depreciation, the significance of 
footnotes—all these matters require extensive 
personal exposure and contact on the part of 
outside directors. To learn about the applica-
tion of financial controls, they need information 
that may be given to them by the company's 
independent accountants, by the financial of-
ficers and employees of the company, and by 
internal auditors. 
The process of intelligent challenge of the com-
pany's accounting and control activities by the 
directors—if a satisfactory means exists—may 
catalyze important substantive improvements. 
This, in turn, opens the way for independent 
CPAs, for the financial officers and employees 
of the company, and for the internal auditors 
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to bring their recommendations to the attention 
of the board of directors. 
To summarize, there are compelling and urgent 
needs: 
• To aid directors in undertaking and fulfilling 
their responsibilities for financial reporting to 
the public; 
• To cope with the corporate image problems 
stemming from tarnished credibility in finan-
cial reporting; 
• To support, at the highest level, efforts to 
substantially improve both the financial 
controls exercised over management and the 
quality of public reporting; 
• To provide better avenues of communication 
between the board of directors and the ex-
ternal and internal auditors. 
A corporate audit committee of competent non-
management directors can be responsive to all 
of these needs. Some managements believe that 
dealing with the independent CPAs is solely an 
operating problem and not the concern of 
members of the board. But the overall sig-
nificance of the issues involved, and the fact 
that management itself must be the subject for 
internal control, argue that increased board con-
centration on the audit function is warranted. 
Benefits flow from the corporate audit com-
mittee to stockholders, directors, management, 
the independent CPA and the accounting pro-
fession. Stockholders are assured that the pro-
tection of corporate assets is being given top 
level attention; stockholders also gain from the 
impact of improved credibility in financial in-
formation. Directors are provided a mechanism 
for the personal contact necessary to their 
responsibilities. Management gets the benefit of 
policy support for improved reporting and con-
trol practices and avoids the potential stigma 
of having operated without independent finan-
cial controls. The independent auditor is as-
sured an attentive audience at the policy level. 
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And the accounting profession benefits be-
cause the cumulative effects raise the level of 
performance. 
If a corporate audit committee is to yield its 
potential benefits, it must be appropriately 
organized, and it must be much more than a 
conduit for financial statements from the au-
ditors to the board. 
Establishment and Composition 
of Audit Committees 
The audit committee should be established by 
a resolution of the board of directors. The 
resolution may be general, or it may set forth 
in detail the objectives and scope of the com-
mittee. The significant factor is that the re-
sponsibilities of the committee should be stated 
in writing. To develop an appropriate founda-
tion for this written statement of scope, the 
entire board should fully discuss the pros and 
cons of an audit committee and the alternative 
roles available to it. 
Corporate audit committees are generally small, 
and in many instances three members seem to 
be enough. In some cases, perhaps particularly 
because of the appropriate insistence of non-
management directors for personal participa-
tion, it may be wiser to establish larger com-
mittees. The committee should be appointed by 
the board and should consist either largely or 
entirely of non-management directors. 
Practice indicates that the best qualifications for 
an audit committee member are—perhaps to a 
slightly higher degree than the typical board 
member—an inquiring mind and breadth of 
knowledge about corporate matters, including 
experience in financial and general management 
functions. Specific knowledge of auditing and 
accounting is not necessary. The ability of the 
chairman of the committee is apt to have a de-
termining effect upon the success of its activities, 
just as the skills of participants always influence 
performance. The chairman should also have 
conviction that the function of the committee is 
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useful. And he should have the inter-personal 
skills to coordinate with management. 
While communication to the committee from 
officers is essential, this interrelationship may 
be obtained by providing for the attendance of 
officers during portions of audit committee 
meetings. Conversely—to obtain full benefit— 
if management directors are members of the 
committee there should be a provision that they 
withdraw from some part of the audit com-
mittee meetings. 
Scope of Audit Committee Function 
The scope of the committee's activities and the 
manner in which the scope is determined may 
have much to do with getting successful inter-
action between management and a corporate 
audit committee. Some officers feel that finan-
cial reporting and controls are solely an operat-
ing problem and should not be interfered with 
by directors. Clearly, the refutation of this posi-
tion lies in the broad needs to be served. In 
practice however, a clear definition of scope 
will minimize difficulties from this source. 
Further, to plan effectively, the audit committee 
must have a clear definition of scope. 
We recommend that a written statement cover-
ing the scope of audit committee activities be 
developed. Although this may be done as part 
of the resolution establishing the committee, we 
suggest that the scope statement be prepared 
after exploratory meetings held first by the man-
agement and the audit committee, then by the 
audit committee and the company's CPAs, and 
finally by the audit committee and management. 
A complete hearing of objectives and objections 
can clarify expectations, promote understand-
ing, foster modifications in scope and increase 
the opportunity for satisfactory performance. 
The activities of an audit committee may and 
should include: 
• Nomination or selection of the auditors 
• Approval of the overall scope of the audit 
• Review of results of the audit 
• Review of the overall control mechanisms 
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The fourth category, control mechanisms, may 
appear to be independent of the first three. 
However, the audit committee must, in fact, 
address itself to control. Otherwise it is im-
possible to evaluate what the audit by the in-
dependent CPAs has done to advance control 
over the financial affairs of the company. The 
only real choice is whether the audit committee 
pursues the nature of control by questioning the 
external auditors or by questioning the financial 
officers, internal auditors and employees of 
the company. 
Nomination or selection of the auditors by the 
audit committee tends to establish that auditors 
are independent of management. The nomina-
tion of auditors ordinarily takes place when 
stockholders directly vote upon the election of 
the auditors, or when they ratify the action 
taken by the board; in some instances the audit 
committee's nomination will be ratified only 
by the board. 
There appears to be general agreement that the 
more important accomplishment, when the 
audit committee nominates or selects auditors, 
is that the external auditors cannot be replaced 
without the approval of the audit committee. 
In this case it is most credible that the auditors 
can stand up to management in the event of 
disagreement. Accordingly, any statement of 
scope should be clear as to the rights of the 
audit committee in connection with the engage-
ment and retention of the external auditors. 
The overall scope of the audit. The audit begins 
to pay off in improved financial reporting when 
it is made responsive to the needs of the com-
pany. There may, of course, be specific prob-
lems within the company that some part of 
management may believe the auditors will 
examine in the ordinary course of events. 
Others on the board may never have thought 
about some of these problems. To establish the 
existence of such problems, and to set specifi-
cations for the external audit, the audit com-
mittee must understand the internal control 
function, including internal audit. 
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While a corporate audit committee should not 
develop detailed audit procedures, such things 
as the degree of audit coverage of subsidiaries 
or divisions, the coverage of stores or plants, and 
the coverage of foreign operations are certainly 
matters for their review. The type of coverage 
to be given to new acquisitions also falls in this 
category as do special problems such as in-
ventory obsolescence, credit circumstances, and 
unusual trends in the industry. None of these 
will be left to chance if they are brought up 
with the auditors in a discussion about the 
scope of work. A written memorandum of the 
scope agreed upon may serve many useful 
purposes in the future. 
Review of results of the audit by the audit com-
mittee is presumably its most important con-
tribution. It is here that the members of the 
committee can learn in detail the auditors' 
thoughts about the fairness of the financial 
presentations. Because the wording of the short-
form opinion obviously does not convey the 
subtleties that would be useful to directors 
in fulfilling their responsibilities, these subtle-
ties should be communicated during personal 
contact. 
The review of the results of the audit should, 
of course, cover not only the fairness of pre-
sentation of financial data, but also the external 
auditors' opinion about controls, financial per-
sonnel, and general business matters. Some feel 
that direct contact between directors and audi-
tors on delicate matters may embarrass manage-
ment and create situations difficult to resolve. 
But the responsibility of the board is paramount 
and overriding. Accordingly, following a review 
with the external auditors, the audit committee 
must transmit to the full board that information 
which it considers pertinent. Based upon the 
report given by its audit committee, the full 
board then acts to approve the financial state-
ments to be included in the annual report. The 
board relies upon the audit committee members 
to discharge their responsibility for adequate 
reporting. It thus behooves the audit committee 
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members to transmit all information that bears 
on the directors' responsibilities. 
Review of the system of internal control by 
the audit committee better serves the purposes 
of the company. Such a review necessarily in-
cludes directing audit activities to control prob-
lems. Audit activity for this purpose may be 
expected to come from both the external and 
internal auditors. Internal control, of course, is 
a function of the system used, including checks 
and balances that come from the structure of 
the organization and the manner of assignment 
of authorities and responsibilities. 
When the scope of the corporate audit com-
mittee includes the internal control function, the 
audit committee may give its fullest attention 
to gaining the knowledge needed to optimize 
the coordination of the external audit function 
with internal activities. Where there is a sig-
nificant internal audit function, as there should 
always be, its effectiveness can be increased by 
allowing it to make reports directly to the cor-
porate audit committee. 
Method of Operation 
The development of a mode of operation should 
begin with exploratory meetings. Each group 
should frankly state what it visualizes may occur 
and should provide the facts upon which to 
develop an agenda. 
Number and timing of meetings. Generally, 
apart from initial and exploratory meetings, 
there should be at least two audit committee 
meetings with the external auditors every year. 
At the year's first meeting, the agenda treats 
what is to be expected during the coming audit; 
at the second meeting, the findings of the audit 
are reviewed and the financial statements are 
received. There is much merit in holding this 
second meeting shortly before the audit is com-
pleted—in the event questions arise that call 
for further action by the auditors. 
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Attendance. At audit committee meetings, the 
independent CPA should minimally be repre-
sented by the partner in charge of the engage-
ment and the staff man in charge of the field 
work. In addition, particularly for larger clients, 
it is quite appropriate that a senior partner not 
directly connected with the engagement should 
also attend. Such a senior partner may make 
important contributions — discussing general 
trends in accounting and auditing, evaluating 
attitudes within the financial community, and 
clarifying the economic backdrop against which 
financial statements are being viewed and eval-
uated. His insights may also serve to sharpen 
perception of the nature of any controversial 
issues that may be encountered. 
In the usual case where the membership of the 
audit committee does not include management's 
chief executive and financial officers, these men 
should be invited to attend the discussions that 
involve the presentation of findings and the im-
plications attached to them. It is necessary, for 
many reasons, that the audit committee have 
the opportunity to evaluate the responses by 
management both to the facts presented and 
to the judgments made by the external auditors. 
Where there is a significant internal audit func-
tion, it is appropriate that the chief internal au-
ditor be present at both the meeting directed 
towards setting specifications of the audit and 
the one for reviewing the audit findings. 
Whether officers serve on or have been invited 
to an audit committee meeting, the meeting 
should include some time when all management 
personnel are excluded and only outside mem-
bers of the audit committee and the. external 
auditors are present. This gives the opportunity 
to evaluate personnel, including top manage-
ment, without restriction. It also permits inti-
mate discussion of the implications of delicate 
policy matters. 
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Agendas should be developed much in advance, 
so that all parties have ample time to prepare. 
We recommend that the typical audit review 
agenda be built around the following items: 
1. Presentation by auditors of financial 
statements 
(a) General explanation of responsibili-
ties assumed by the independent 
auditors 
(b) Comments concerning accounting 
principles used, particularly those 
affected by change 
(c) Comments on interpretation of in-
dividual balance sheet items, in-
cluding the potential for variation 
as to amounts stated 
(d) Comments on interpretation of fi-
nancial results, including trends, ex-
planations of trends and changes in 
character of the business 
(e) Comments about auditing problems, 
including scope and results in im-
portant or sensitive areas 
2. Presentation by auditors of comments 
and recommendations on internal control 
(a) Management letter, if preparation is 
possible in time for the meeting 
(b) General evaluation of organization 
3. Discussion of new APB pronouncements 
and of APB pending items and general 
accounting trends 
4. Comments about service other than au-
diting performed during year 
The external auditors will benefit from refer-
ence to written material used during their oral 
presentations. At the least, a record of points 
to be covered should be given to members of 
the audit committee. 
Any attempt to develop in writing all the dis-
cussion that is contemplated can, at the least, 
be very uneconomical. More importantly, the 
written material should tend only to focus dis-
cussion, not to limit and restrict a free inter-
change of thoughts. 
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Expected APB pronouncements and trends 
should not be treated in technical detail. Rath-
er, there should be a very brief discussion of 
such matters that are pertinent to the client's 
general affairs. 
Internal control activities must be explored, but 
the means must be accommodated to the situa-
tion. As previously discussed, the audit com-
mittee may choose to learn about internal con-
trol from the independent CPAs. On the other 
hand, the responsibility of the committee may 
call more directly for personal contact with 
internal auditors, chief financial officers at the 
corporate level and financial officers at divi-
sional levels. 
Establishing internal control as an item on the 
agenda contributes to efficient coverage of the 
function. Depending upon the multiplicity of 
control areas that exist, and the degree of depth 
that carrying out the scope of the committee re-
quires, an extensive discussion of internal con-
trol may be needed. In some cases, several 
exploratory meetings should be held simply to 
resolve the scope of this agenda item. 
Because today's information and control sys-
tems are so integrated, contacts might also be 
wanted with functional officers outside the ac-
counting and finance function. 
Conclusion 
A corporate audit committee—properly staffed 
and chartered, and acting in a fertile environ-
ment—will promote independent, critical and 
creative thought, will raise the level of internal 
financial control, and will improve the quality 
of reported financial information. In addition, 
all parties—the public, stockholders, manage-
ment, directors, auditors and governmental 
bodies—will have justifiably increased confi-
dence in the fairness and adequacy of the com-
pany's financial reports. We confidently expect 
that the corporate audit committee will come 
to be recognized as one of the essentials of 
enlightened managements. 
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QUESTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE 
ASKED INDEPENDENT CPAs 
BY AN AUDIT COMMITTEE 
These illustrations are based on actual situations(5) 
and are not intended to be all inclusive. With every 
question, the context in which the question is 
asked—the extent of an audit committee member's 
background knowledge in the particular area and 
in financial and audit matters in general, the finan-
cial condition of the company and the quality of 
its finance, accounting and internal auditing per-
sonnel—will certainly influence the form of the 
question and the nature of the response. 
Audit scope and results 
1. Do the independent public accountants be-
lieve that the scope of the examination is 
appropriate in the circumstances? Did man-
agement attempt to, or, in fact, place any 
restrictions on the scope of the examination 
and its implementation? Were there any 
major additions to or deletions from the audit 
program as compared with last year? 
2. Did the independent public accountants audit 
all of the company's units, whether consoli-
dated or unconsolidated? If not, which were 
omitted and why? 
3. What type of work is performed by the inde-
pendent public accountants in the case of 
business acquisitions? 
4. Do the independent public accountants reg-
ularly rotate the staff on the engagement? 
5. Have the independent public accountants 
noted any indications of a possible change in 
the character of the business? 
(5) In large measure, these questions are taken from 
two actually-used listings contained in a full account 
of the Research Study sponsored by the Touche Ross 
Foundation. See footnote (2) on page 1. 
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6. Are there any serious internal control weak-
nesses outstanding? What recommendations 
have been made by the independent public 
accountants relating to internal control, or-
ganization, operations, and internal report-
ing, and what action has management taken 
regarding such recommendations? 
7. How cooperative were company personnel? 
8. What is the opinion of the independent pub-
lic accountants as to the quality of the ac-
counting and financial staffs? Is the com-
pany's internal audit staff adequate? 
9. What is the quality of the long-range plan-
ning and budgetary controls employed by 
the company? 
10. Does the company use its electronic data 
processing equipment effectively? 
11. Is the company's policy and procedure man-
ual reasonably formal and maintained on a 
current basis? 
12. What have the independent public account-
ants done to determine any possible conflict 
of interest? Are company procedures designed 
to avoid such conflicts adequate in the cir-
cumstances? 
13. Has the management ever exceeded its au-
thority in any matters prescribed by the di-
rectors, or failed to comply with any resolu-
tion passed by the directors? 
Financial statements—assets 
1. For what periods are the company's time de-
posits committed? What are the company's 
compensating balance requirements? 
2. Has the quoted market of the company's 
short-term investments changed significantly 
since year end? And what is the current think-
ing about carrying such investments at quoted 
market? 
3. Why is the allowance for doubtful receiv-
ables lower than last year despite an increase 
in receivables? What is the average age of 
accounts compared to a year ago, and how is 
the change explained? Is the company follow-
ing an appropriate credit policy? Are there 
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any large individual amounts where collecti-
bility is in question? Are any of these re-
ceivables for an extended time period? Have 
any receivables been discounted or pledged? 
Are there any receivables from officers or 
other management employees? 
4. Are inventory physical controls adequate? 
Has the LIFO method of valuing inventories 
been considered? 
5. What steps have the independent public ac-
countants taken with respect to inventories at 
outside locations? 
6. Does the company generate internal reports 
on the condition of inventories, so that timely 
action can be taken with respect to possible 
obsolescence? Were any significant write-
downs incurred? Generally, what have the 
outside auditors done to satisfy themselves 
that the inventory as stated on the balance 
sheet does not contain obsolete or excess 
stock? 
7. What is the basis of valuation of long-term 
investments? Is the valuation more or less 
than quoted market? 
8. How does the company's equity in foreign 
companies compare with cost? How much is 
really at risk when intercompany receivables 
and temporary advances are considered? How 
does the company effectively hedge its ex-
posure? 
9. Why does the company use accelerated 
methods of depreciation for some items but 
not for others? Why is the same method of 
depreciation used for book and tax purposes? 
Is the company's policy regarding the differ-
entiation between capital and expense items 
still responsive to its needs? 
10. Does the company have any significant pro-
posed leases which might require capitaliza-
tion? 
11. Is the company policy regarding amortization 
of intangible assets realistic? Should the com-
pany consider prospective amortization of 
goodwill arising from acquisitions before 
November 1, 1970? 
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Financial statements— 
liabilities and stockholders' equity 
1. What is the status of Federal income taxes, 
such as open years and items in dispute? Does 
the accrual for Federal income taxes appear 
to be adequate to cover possible assessments 
upon examination by the IRS? 
2. Has the company complied with debt inden-
ture obligations, or have waivers been re-
quired? 
3. Are there any restrictions pertaining to senior 
stock issues that effectively limit company 
activities? Are there retained earnings re-
strictions of any kind? Has the company pur-
chased any treasury stock during the year, 
and, if so, for what purposes? 
4. Has the company made any charges or credits 
directly to stockholders' equity? Why? 
5. What is the company's policy on funding 
past service liabilities relating to retirement 
plans? Over what period of time is past serv-
ice being amortized? What amount of the 
total past service liability has been funded? 
Has the company's practice followed a con-
sistent pattern? 
6. Are there any contingencies of a legal or 
other nature as to which the appropriate treat-
ment, provision or mere disclosure, was in 
doubt? 
7. Has the company made any unusual com-
mitments regarding, for example, the pur-
chase of inventories, or the acquisition or 
construction of property assets? How well 
does the company's capital budgeting system 
seem to be working? 
Financial statements—general 
1. Are other companies in the industry giving 
more or less information than we are plan-
ning to give in the financial statements and 
elsewhere in our report? 
2. Why are general and administrative costs 
allocated in arriving at segmented operating 
results? Can there be further refinement in 
directly identifying costs now allocated? 
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3. Have there been any significant changes in 
the company's accounting practices in the 
year? Do all of the company's accounting 
practices fall within generally accepted ac-
counting principles? Where "free choice" al-
ternate principles are available, which are 
being used by the company? What would be 
the impact of using the other available 
choices? Are the company's accounting prac-
tices appropriate for its specific needs? 
4. Were there any unusual items reflected in the 
operating results for the year? Are any of the 
operations incurring a loss? 
5. Were there any prior-year adjustments? What 
was the rationale in so treating them? 
6. What are the reasons for excluding specified 
subsidiary companies from full consolida-
tions, and what are the prospects for changes? 
7. Were there any transactions with non-sub-
sidiary affiliated or related companies? 
8. How are earnings per share computed? Why 
don't the quarterly figures add up to the 
cumulative figure? 
9. Are there any adopted or proposed Account-
ing Principle Board opinions or Securities 
and Exchange Commission requirements that 
will materially affect the company's account-
ing methods or financial position in the near 
future? Has there been full compliance with 
existing opinions and requirements? 
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